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Speaking about ideologies, we can usually differentiate between two aspects: a practical and a 
theoretical. By practical aspect I mean the principles ideologies advocate and endeavor to 
realize, such as laws or policies. These practical principles are usually based on theoretical 
foundations, presuppositions, like theories of human nature, society, or development. these 
constitute the other aspect. The theoretical foundations and the practical guidelines are, of 
course, interdependent, since theoretical presuppositions limit the range of the possible 
practical principles, or make some of them more feasible. The link between them is, however, 
not necessary or predetermined.  
These two aspects and the connection between them, that is, the theoretical foundation 
of a practical program, may vary in the case of different ideologies. Especially conservatism 
may seem to be an exception because of its ant-theoretical stance, but exactly its organicist 
and evolutionist view about society or its skepticism about human reason and rationality can 
be regarded as theoretical foundations. It is not an exaggeration to say that liberalism is the 
ideology where this link between theoretical foundation and practical principles is the most 
important and explicit. A main characteristic of liberalism is the endeavor to found all 
practical principles on a solid and universalistic theoretical ground. In other words, liberals 
deduce all political principles from a universal view of human nature and society; therefore, 
these principles are the same everywhere, and there is no room for any cultural or historical 
differences, exceptions. As a result, liberalism is the most rigid and the least flexible ideology. 
This strong link between theoretical foundations and practical principles and the 
rigidity it produces result in a special kind of criticism: there are many thinkers who agree 
with the practical aims of liberalism but criticize its theoretical foundations. They propose a 
change in the latter to defend the former. 
Just to mention a few of them, John Gray sharply criticizes recent, post-Rawlsian 
academic liberalism for its universalistic, impartial, neutral, Kantian character, and he claims 
these false, unrealistic theoretical assumptions are the cause of the gap between academic 
liberals and political practice: “the thoughts of the new liberals evoke no political echo in any 
of the liberal democracies: the project of securing practical agreement on principles of justice 
among metaphysically and historically neutered Kantian selves arouses little interest, 
inexplicably, among the political classes, or the voters, of the Western world, or anywhere 
else.” (Gray 1997: 4) Despite his sharp criticism, Gray is not anti-liberal, but he argues for a 
renewal of liberalism, which should consist in abandoning the universalistic assumptions and 
replacing them with the idea of modus vivendi (Gray 2000).  
Another example is George Lakoff, who sharply criticizes the objectivist 
epistemology, on which liberalism is based. In his view, false practical advices follow from 
this epistemology: according to the liberals their task is just to tell the people the facts, and 
then people will reach the right conclusions and vote for the liberals. “But we know from 
cognitive science that people do not think like that. People think in frames. […] To be 
accepted, the truth must fit people’s frames. If the facts do not fit a frame, the frame stays and 
the facts bounce off.” (Lakoff 2004: 17) The theoretical shift from objectivist epistemology to 
a more realistic one, which is based on framing theory and the theory of metaphors, should 
result in a new communication strategy of the liberals, which is based on framing the political 
debates and accepting the moral character of politics (Lakoff 2002). 
The third example is communitarianism. Although communitarianism is often opposed 
to liberalism, this opposition mainly refers to theoretical questions, while regarding the 
practical principles the two approaches are not so far from each other. For example, when 
Amitai Etzioni speaks about the importance of moral concepts and virtues, and he defines the 
criteria these concepts must comply with, we can actually find liberal standards: non-
discrimination, applicability to all members of community, generalizability, justifiability, and 
that they should not be based on special interests but on common justice (Reese-Schäfer 
2000:41–42). The main opposition between communitarianism and liberalism refers to a 
theoretical question: the relation between individuals and community. According to the 
communitarians, we cannot understand society solely as an aggregate of individuals, ignoring 
the constitutive role of community, language, or culture. 
These examples show that the critics’ problem with liberalism is not only theoretical, 
but they claim that these false theoretical assumptions result in the failure of liberal parties. 
The debate about the theoretical foundations is, therefore, not only an academic diversion, but 
it endeavors to explain the unpopularity of liberal politics today. 
This unpopularity needs, however, some further clarification. It is commonly held that 
liberalism is in crisis, which manifests itself in the bad election results of liberal parties.
2
 In a 
historical perspective, however, we can find that liberalism can also be regarded as the most 
successful ideology, since most of its original aims have been realized, which cannot be said 
about other ideologies. The most successful countries can be characterized as liberal 
democracies. The reason behind the unpopularity of liberalism is therefore, at least partly, that 
the original purposes of liberalism are realized, and present democratic political systems work 
according to the basic liberal principles. Liberalism thus seems to be an ended project. The 
crisis of liberalism stems from the situation that after realizing its aims, liberalism cannot 
grasp the social and political challenges arising in a liberal democracy. In my analysis of the 
present situation of liberalism, I will focus on this question: Is liberalism really an outdated 
ideology, and do the present social and political challenges need an answer in which 
liberalism is not competent? 
 I what follows first I examine the relation of the theoretical foundations of liberalism 
to the mainstream of political science. In this context we can find the interesting situation that 
the main theoretical assumptions of liberalism, in fact, coincided with the methodological 
foundations of the post Second World War political science, at least with the mainstream of 
the Anglo-Saxon political science. In this period behaviorism and rational choice theory 
dominated the discipline. The basic unit of the research was the individual, who was an 
autonomous actor, having stable preferences, calculating rationally, and deciding in a profit-
maximizing manner. The outcomes of political processes were aggregates of such individual 
decisions or actions. These theoretical assumptions were very akin to the liberal 
individualism. Of course, it would be too rash statement that there is any clear causal 
relationship between the two in either directions, and the examination of this question is not 
subject of this paper. 
 What is interesting here is the criticism on this mainstream of political science and the 
emerging new approaches since the eighties. Many scholars found that behaviorism and 
rational choice theory cannot explain political processes thoroughly. The main objection was 
that individual rationality and aggregation of individual decisions cannot alone explain the 
functioning of politics, and further explanatory factors are needed. The most promising 
candidates for this role are institutions, and thus approaches called new institutionalism are 
expected to provide an alternative to replace or at least to supplement behaviorism and 
rational choice theory.  
The term new institutionalism refers to more approaches, e.g., rational choice, 
historical, or sociological institutionalism, which may diverge in several respects, with the 
common focus of the importance of institutions. According to these approaches institutions as 
independent explanatory factors must be included in the explanations of political outcomes. 
Institutions reduce the number of alternatives thus limit the range of possible individual 
actions or decisions. Political processes therefore cannot be seen as aggregates of individual 
behavior.  
                                                 
2
 This is obviously not true of the Democratic Party in the United States, but this party is not liberal in 
the classical, European sense. 
Besides institutions, another factor comes into prominence in the explanations, namely 
discourses or ideas, which are also regarded as independent explanatory factors. In fact, ideas 
or discourses as explanatory factors emerge in all of the new institutionalist approaches (Blyth 
1997), and often a new version of institutionalism is declared: discursive institutionalism 
(Schmitt 2010). Furthermore, apart from institutionalism, the growing importance of ideas is a 
common topic in political science, and this trend is often referred as “ideational turn” (Gofas 
and Hay 2010; Béland and Cox 2011). 
Summing up, new approaches try to supplement behaviorist and rational choice 
theories, namely new institutionalist and ideational or discursive approaches. Of course, it 
cannot be said that the former mainstream theories are over. On the one hand, these 
approaches continue to be used is political science researches; on the other hand, the 
advocates of the new approaches usually do not say that that the former approaches should be 
completely rejected; rather they speak of the supplementation of them.  
There is no room here to thoroughly discuss what the novelties of the new approaches 
are. Instead, I restrict myself to examine the innovations affecting the theoretical base of 
liberalism. Thus, I focus on a special role of the non-individual factors in the explanations. 
These factors are institutions and ideas, and the role I am interested in is the constructivist 
character with which they endow the explanations of political processes. There are authors 
who emphasize the constructivist character of new institutionalism (e.g., Schmidt 2010a, 
2010b, 2011), and sometimes it is spoken about constructivist institutionalism as a separate 
approach (Hay 2008, 2011). I think, however, that most of the institutionalist and ideational 
approaches can be characterized as constructivist even if there is no such explicit reference to 
this standpoint.  
I use the term constructivism as opposed to objectivism. According to objectivism, the 
things of the world—in this case, e.g., the alternatives of political decisions, the reasons for 
and against these alternatives—are clearly and objectively cognizable; that is, they are the 
same for everyone, and if not, it is a kind of deficiency and can be corrected. Of course, there 
is some room for manipulating the facts; e.g., in campaigns politicians try to manipulate what 
the electors think. But in this case, according to the objectivist approach, the manipulating 
effect of the campaign is result of intentional action. Thus, even if we can speak of the effect 
of ideas, this is not an independent factor but an instrumental one. As opposed to this 
approach, we can speak of constructivism if other factors than individual actions—e.g., ideas 
or institutions—shape political processes and cognition of the actors. 
To understand the constructivist character of institutions, we have to consider a special 
effect of them: the limitation function. The role of institutions is usually defined as limiting 
the possibilities or alternatives for political action or decision. As we can read in the first 
seminal work of new institutionalism: “Some potential participants, issues, viewpoints, or 
values are ignored or suppressed […]. Politics is uncoupled from administration, and various 
parts of administration are uncoupled from each other. Coordination among several 
components or a problem is uncoupled from the solving the several parts. Some things are 
taken as given in deciding other things. Paradigms and ideologies focus attention on some 
things, distract attention from others. Institutions define individual, group, and societal 
identities, what it means to belonging to a specific collective. Such identities represent 
barriers to trade—they signify something nonexchangeable and thus simplify the problems of 
trade.” (March and Olsen 1989: 17). This limitation function of institutions does not 
necessarily entail constructivism. We cannot speak of constructivism if institutions are 
designed and built by actors; that is, all the effects of institutions are results of intentional 
actions and decisions. In this case we do not leave the terrain of the individualistic and 
objectivist approaches. Thus, the so called rational choice institutionalism cannot be regarded 
constructivist. This approach is based on the assumption that actors start from tabula rasa, and 
the characteristics of institutions depends exclusively on the intentions of actors (Peters 2005: 
51). 
Most of the institutionalist approaches, however, do not share this assumption, and 
they claim institutions and their effects are not completely intentional but results of different 
non-individual factors as well, e.g., historical paths, culture, discourses, or ideas. These 
institutionalist approaches can be called constructivist because according to them non-
intentional factors shape political processes and phenomena. Accordingly, the world of 
politics is not cognizable objectively because in different historical or cultural circumstances 
it would have other characteristics. In other words, most things in politics, especially the 
possible alternatives, the features and effects attached to them, and the beliefs about them, are 
constructed by non-intended historical, cultural, etc., circumstances.  
After discussing the constructivist features of new institutionalism, now I turn to the 
question of how this trend affects the possibilities of liberalism. An academic paradigm shift, 
of course, does not directly result in a change in practical politics. Indirectly, however, it may 
have an effect because the belief that the theoretical assumptions are false may make it 
difficult to advocate and implement liberal principles.  
Regarding the relationship between constructivism and liberalism, we can conclude 
that they are basically opposed. The liberal universalism usually couple with objectivist 
epistemology, which says truth does not depend on the circumstances. Thus, the alternatives 
for political actions and their effects are clearly cognizable in a rational debate. This 
standpoint clearly contradicts the constructivist elements of the new institutionalist 
approaches.  
But to refine this relationship, we need to have a closer look at the normative 
implications of the new institutionalist approaches. The statement that historical or cultural 
factors influence the perception of political phenomena is a descriptive statement, and it is an 
open question what kind of normative conclusions we derive from it. One possible answer 
might be that historical and cultural factors cannot or should not be modified, and thus we 
have to accept them and shape our political actions in accordance with them. To take a 
practical example: if neoliberal economic reform policy does not fit into the local historical 
and cultural framework, then we have to find other solutions harmonizing with the 
circumstances.  
This question, that is, how we should judge the fact that certain factors modify the 
perception of political alternatives, is usually not discussed in the literature of new 
institutuonalism. Economic policy, especially neoliberal reform, is often topic of new 
institutionalist analyses (e.g., Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2002; Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010), 
but these works only analyze how successful the neoliberal economic policy reforms can be in 
different circumstances, usually keeping away from judging those circumstances or from 
saying that these reforms are the best tools for economic policy.  
This distance from normative judgments is understandable, since new institutinalist 
approaches—in spite of their criticisms of the former mainstream theories—do not want to 
return to a normative political science. It is evident that political science and ideologies are 
two separate things. On the other hand, however, as it was mentioned earlier, certain 
theoretical assumptions may favor an ideology. As it was also said, the former mainstream 
approaches, that is, behaviorism and rational choice, were more akin to liberalism; thus, the 
new one, especially its constructivist part, may be rather opposed to it. But it was also 
mentioned that new institutionalism is rather neutral in ideological questions. Thus, its 
ideological implications are rather non-direct. To present such implications, I have 
summarized the possible normative consequences of the two opposed epistemological 
standpoints, i.e., objectivism and constructivism, in some topics that may be important for 
political practice. 
 Objectivism  Constructivism 
There is one universal solution for policies In different circumstances different solutions are 
needed 
In case of disagreement one side has a kind of 
defect; thus, defect and disagreement can be 
eliminated by enlightenment 
Disagreement derives from different standpoints; 
thus, disagreement is unavoidable 
Asymmetrical relationship between lay people 
and experts 
Equal relationship 
Representative democracy Participatory or deliberative democracy 
  
Of course, this characterization is oversimplified, and one could easily find counter-examples. 
On the other hand, however, the characteristics listed under constructivism are common topics 
of recent theoretical endeavors, for example in the burgeoning literature of deliberative 
democracy and democratization of science. Even if these works, which usually criticize 
rationalist and objectivist theories, cannot be regarded as mainstream yet, but they are 
represented by very influential scholars on very important forums (e.g., Dryzek 1990, 2000; 
Fischer and Forester 1993; Fischer 2003). A sharp opposition between objectivist approaches 
and constructivist theories is thus an important topic in recent political science literature, and 
the former is often connected to representative democracy, while letter to deliberative or 
participatory. In this debates liberalism often emerges on the representative side, for example, 
deliberative democracy is often opposed to liberal democracy. 
The question is whether we can find arguments in liberal ideology that can be exceed 
the objectivist tenets listened above. In my view, a special interpretation of rationality can be 
regarded as such. Rationality is a basic principle of liberalism (Freeden 1996: 148–150), and 
it is often interpreted in an objectivist way: if people are enlightened properly, they will 
behave rationally and recognize the truth, and consensus will be reached. We can, however, 
abandon the objectivist and universalist elements, while keeping rationality. Rationality in this 
case means that decisions or standpoints must be supported with proper arguments, and these 
arguments must be transparent, debated, and tested. This interpretation is very close to 
deliberation. Deliberation in a wider sense means “that individuals should always be prepared 
to defend their moral and political arguments and claims with reasons, and be prepared to 
deliberate with others about the reasons they provide” (Pateman 2012: 8). Deliberation is thus 
a wider concept than participation, and deliberative democracy means not necessarily 
participation, as Pateman claims.  
Perhaps we can call this kind of deliberation a liberal version of it. In the next four 
points I summarize what the characteristics of this liberal deliberation would be in the light of 
the above characterization of objectivism and constructivism.  
 
 First, to find a universal truth is too problematic, but progress is possible, and so 
the effects of different non-individual factors can be understood more and more. 
 Second, disagreement perhaps cannot be eliminated, but if the standpoints are 
contested, they will be more reflexive and tolerant. 
 Third, experts have special knowledge as compared to lay people, but their 
knowledge, methods, theories, and work must be transparent and contested 
publicly (against other experts). 
 Democracy must contain some deliberative elements, but this rather means the 
open debate with experts or specialized groups.  
 
In short, policies must be tested against experts, and experts’ knowledge must be defended 
publicly. This would be a third way between pure participative democracy and citizen 
participation. 
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